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INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter
HIPAA). 1 The stated objective of the HIPAA was:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability
and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health
insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical
savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and
coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for
other purposes.'
The Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) authorized in the HIPAA
are savings accounts designed to pay for health care expenses.3 For
the past several years, a debate has raged over whether Medical Savings
Accounts should be given a preferential tax treatment. The HIPAA
contains a provision creating a demonstration program that allows the
establishment of a limited number of MSAs with a preferential tax
* J.D. 1998, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1991, University of Washington. The
author would like to thank Professor Sheldon Frankel for his suggestions and assistance, the
members of the Law Review Editorial Board and the article editorial committee for their careful
and thoughtful suggestions and encouragement, and, finally, her family and friends for their
neverending support during the writing process.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
2. Id. at 1936, Synopsis (emphasis added).
3. Throughout this Comment, MSA refers only to the actual trust or custodial account.
The MSAs discussed in this Comment have also, in the past, been referred to as Medical
Spending Accounts, Medisave, and Medical IRAs.
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treatment.4  As adopted, this provision represents a compromise
between those who advocate unlimited allowance of MSAs and those
who are concerned about their potential effects.
Because of concerns that MSAs will cause adverse selection in the
traditional health insurance market, the HIPAA contains safeguards
designed to prevent, or at least limit, this potential harm. The
safeguards placed on this demonstration program include limiting the
maximum number of participating accounts to 750,000. s In addition,
preferential tax treatment is available only for MSAs held either by
employees of small businesses or by self-employed people and created
in conjunction with a qualified high-deductible health insurance plan.6
Finally, a four-year study is to be completed by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) to determine whether MSAs cause adverse selection
or have other negative effects.7 However, while an attempt has been
made to limit the possible negative effects that might occur, these
safeguards do not fully address the concerns presented by MSAs. s
4. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (1996), Title III-Tax Related Health
Provisions, Subtitle A § 301 (creating I.R.C. § 220, changing current section 220 to section 221,
creating I.R.C. § 4890E, and adding and amending other sections).
5. I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997). However, there are lower interim caps for the
initial years. Enrollment will be cut off if enrollment limits are reached as follows:
375,000 by April 30, 1997, I.R.C. § 2206)(1)(A);
525,000 by June 30, 1997, I.R.C. § 2206)(2)(B);
600,000 by April 15, 1998, I.R.C. § 2206)(2)(A);
750,000 by April 15, 1999, I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A).
However, previously uninsured people who obtain Medical Savings Accounts do not count toward
the interim caps. I.R.C. § 2206)(3).
Note: the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) is title 26 of the United States Code.
6. I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A). Additionally, the individual cannot be covered by other insurance.
See I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A)(ii). Exceptions to this rule are coverage for benefits provided by
insurance, I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(B)(i); and by accident, disability, dental, vision or long-term care
coverage, I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(B)(ii).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2052 § 301(1) (1996). However, the study's method
is flawed because the limitation that MSAs can be opened only by people who are self-employed
or employed by small businesses will not provide an adequate opportunity to determine whether
adverse selection will result. Adverse selection will not be properly tested because small
businesses generally do not offer more than one choice of health insurance. See, e.g., IRS Issues
MSA Guidelines, HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WEEKLY 10, Dec. 11, 1996 (summarizing Gail Shearer
of Consumers Union). See also Finally a Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, late ed., July 27, 1996, p. 22.
Additionally, the study's four year duration will not show the long-term effects. The flaws in this
demonstration program and study will be more fully developed later in this Comment. See infra
notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
8. The first year of the insurer survey portion of the study has been completed. WESTAT,
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT DEMONSTRATION SUMMARY FINDINGS FROM FIRST INSURERS
SURVEY (submitted to U.S. General Accounting Office Dec. 15, 1997). Because of the cost and
low initial enrollment, the General Accounting Office has decided that it will not conduct the
demographic study until enrollment in MSAs reaches 375,000. Medical Savings Accounts: GAO
Shelves Demographics Survey, Lobbyists Want Medicare Caps Lifted, BNA's Medicare Report, Oct.
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This Comment will discuss the MSA provision of the HIPAA.
Part I discusses the basic operation of MSAs and the study of the
effects that MSAs have on the traditional health insurance market and
health care costs. The use of tax provisions and tax policy to further
the goals of health policy, especially in the context of this provision,
will be evaluated in Part II. Part III considers whether this provision
meets general tax policy goals, specifically, the goals of equity,
simplicity, and efficiency. Finally, Part IV suggests ways that this
provision could be changed to make it more consistent with sound
policy.
This Comment argues that the MSA provision of the HIPAA fails
to meet the goals of either tax policy or health policy. As a result of
this failure, the demonstration program should be redesigned to
provide valid and reliable information about whether the availability of
tax-preferred MSAs will decrease the affordability of health care and
its availability to the less healthy.
I. MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS GENERALLY AND THE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
The MSA provision in the HIPAA9 creates a demonstration
program that allows, on a limited basis, self-employed people and
employees of small businesses1" to open tax-preferred MSAs in
conjunction with the purchase of high deductible health insurance."
The GAO is required to complete a study to determine the effects that
the availability of tax-preferred MSAs has on health insurance and
health care costs.12
24, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Lib., BNAmed file [hereinafter GAO Shelves Demographics
Survey].
9. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), Title III-Tax Related Health Provisions,
Subtitle A, § 301.
10. For purposes of this Act, a small business is defined as a business employing less than
50 people. I.R.C. § 220(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
11. I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A)(i).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2037, Title III-Tax Related Health Provisions,
Subtitle A, § 301(1). As will be discussed later, Westat, which received the contract to complete
this study has made its report of its findings from the survey of insurers for 1997. See infra notes
120-30 and accompanying text. The rest of the study has not yet been completed. See GAO
Shelves Demographic Survey, supra note 8.
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A. What Is a Medical Savings Account?
An MSA is a trust or custodial account that is opened for the
purpose of paying the account holder's qualified medical expenses.13
MSAs are similar in their operation and structure to Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 4 They are also similar to flexible
spending accounts (FSAs), i5 except that the employee with an MSA
gets to keep any money left at the end of the year, while any money
left in an FSA reverts to the employer at the end of the year.' 6
To open an MSA, an individual must obtain a high-deductible
health insurance plan. 7 The individual may then place money, tax-
free, into a custodial or trust account (the MSA). 18 The MSA funds
may be used to pay the high deductible, if and when medical expenses
are incurred. Because high-deductible insurance is less expensive, the
difference in premiums can be put into the MSA. Further, proponents
believe that allowing people to keep all of the money in the MSA that
they do not use for medical expenses will create an incentive to utilize
medical care more wisely.'9 Wise use of medical care, in this context,
is economically efficient use. Use is economically efficient when a
patient is fully informed and does not purchase unnecessary or wasteful
health care services.
13. I.R.C. § 220(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997). Qualified medical expenses are those expenses
that qualify for medical deduction under I.R.C. § 213(d). I.R.C. § 220(d)(2).
14. Individual retirement accounts are also custodial or trust accounts that allow individuals
within certain income limits to receive a deduction for limited amounts of contributions made to
a retirement account on behalf of an individual not covered by another retirement program. See
I.R.C. § 408. The account holder's income affects the amount of contribution eligible for
deduction. Id. For more information on IRAs, see I.R.C. § 408.
15. Flexible spending accounts allow an employee to choose the type and amount of
insurance they want. These are offered with cafeteria plans, which are authorized by I. R.C. § 125.
Contributions are made to the flex account based on the employee's election. The contributions
are taken out of the employee's before tax earnings, because it is considered an employer-provided
health benefit. However, the funds in the FSA, if unused, revert to the employer at the end of
the year, which creates an incentive to use all of the funds in the FSA. See JOHN C. GOODMAN
& GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CONTROLLING
HEALTH CARE COSTS WITH MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 20 (1992) [hereinafter GOODMAN
& MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS].
16. Id.
17. I.R.C. § 220(c)(1)(A)(i).
18. Id.
19. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 249 (1992) [hereinafter GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT




In theory, wiser, more informed use will result in reduced health
care utilization and, therefore, will reduce overall health care costs. 20
According to one estimate, seventy-three percent of all people spend
less than $500 per year on health care. 2' Because most people do not
use as much health care as they are insured for, proponents believe that
a higher deductible will encourage consumers to choose more carefully
the health care they receive.22 Additionally, insurance claims will not
have to be filed or processed until the deductible is reached.23
Overall, such utilization may result in substantial administrative
24savings.
B. The Demonstration Program
The MSA demonstration program is to run for four years,
beginning on January 1, 1997, and ending on December 31, 2000.2
Enrollment will be cut off if it reaches one of the interim caps or
750,000.26 During this period, the GAO is to contract for a study27
evaluating the effects of MSAs in the small group market on selection
and adverse selection,2" health costs, 29  use of preventive care,3"
consumer choice,3 scope of coverage of plans purchased in conjunc-
20. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249. See also
GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 22.
21. NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS No. 203, MISPLACED
CRITICISM OF MSAS (1996) [hereinafter NCPA, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 203] (visited Mar. 6,
1997) <http://www.public-policy.org/-ncpa/ba/ba203> (citing 1989 survey findings reported
by Gail A. Jensen and Robert J. Morlock in J. AMER. HEALTH, May-June 1994).
22. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249. See also
GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 23.
23. However, to determine when the deductible has been reached, as well as to allow
completion of the required IRS reporting, records will still have to be maintained. For more
information on reporting requirements, see infra notes 62, 185-95 and accompanying text.
Therefore, although the administrative burden may be lessened, it will not be entirely eliminated.
24. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249. One estimate is
that use of MSAs could result in a savings of up to $33 billion per year in reduced administrative
costs. Id. See also AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS:
COST IMPLICATIONS AND DESIGN ISSUES 15-16 (1995) [hereinafter AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
ACTUARIES, COST IMPLICATIONS]; GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE
COSTS, supra note 15, at 22.
25. I.R.C. § 220(i)(2) (West Supp. 1997). Continuation after 2000 would be up to
Congress, as would increasing the availability of tax-preferred MSAs. However, the tax-preferred
status of MSAs opened under this program will not be terminated when the program ends.
26. See supra note 5.
27. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2052-53 § 301(1) (1996).
28. Id. § 301(l)(1) (1996).
29. Id. § 301(l)(2) (1996).
30. Id. § 301(1)(3) (1996).
31. Id. § 301(l)(4) (1996).
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tion with MSAs, 2 and "other relevant items."33 The GAO contract
is to be with an organization that has expertise in health economics,
health insurance markets, and actuarial science.34
As of June 30, 1997, only 22,051 MSAs had been created under
the program, 17,145 of which count toward the caps.3" Although the
first portion of the insurer survey has been completed, 6 the GAO has
decided to wait to complete the demographic study until 375,000
MSAs are opened. 7 The GAO claims that it is not cost effective to
complete the study until there are more participants.38
One focus of the study is adverse selection. Adverse selection
occurs when healthy people leave the traditional health insurance pool,
leaving the least healthy people in the traditional health insurance pool.
This increases the cost of traditional health insurance. Adverse
selection is to be studied in this program because of the concerns that
MSAs, coupled with high-deductible insurance, are for "the healthy
and the wealthy," that they will destroy the traditional insurance pools,
and that they will result in only the poor and the sick remaining in the
traditional pool. The people left in the traditional insurance pool
would face higher premium costs, because of their higher health care
expenses. This could price some people out of the private health
insurance market. If MSAs cause adverse selection to the extent that
opponents fear, the allowance of MSAs will increase the risk to insurers
of insuring people under traditional policies.39
Thus, the study is supposed to determine whether the availability
of MSAs will have a negative impact on the traditional health
insurance market.4" Additional factors to be looked at in the study
address some of the other concerns that have been raised about MSAs,
such as the effect MSAs will have on the use of preventive care.g" If
MSAs are to be given preferential tax treatment and encouraged, their
effects need to be determined. However, as will be discussed later in
32. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2052-53 § 301(l)(5) (1996).
33. Id. § 301(1)(6) (1996).
34. Id. § 301(1) (1996).
35. I.R.S. Ann. 97-96, 1997-39 I.R.B. 15. To determine the number of MSAs that count
toward the cap the total number of MSAs was reduced by the number of accounts opened by the
previously uninsured (3,670) and increased by the number of taxpayers that were reported as
excludable because their spouse had also established an MSA (1,236).
36. See WESTAT, supra note 8.
37. GAO Shelves Demographics Survey, supra note 8.
38. Id.
39. Michael T. Bond, et al., Medical Savings Accounts: The Newest Medical Cost Reduction
Tool for Employers, BUS. HORIZONS, July 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bhoriz File.
40. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2052-53 § 301(1) (1996).
41. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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this Comment, accomplishment of this goal will require that the study
be redesigned.42
C. The High Deductible Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts
To qualify for a tax-preferred MSA, the accompanying individual
high-deductible policy must have a deductible of at least $1,500 per
year, but not more than $2,250; 4" the policy's out-of-pocket limit
must not be more than $3,000 per year." The deductible for families
must be at least $3,000, but not more than $5,000, 4s with an annual
out-of-pocket limit of not more than $5,500.46 Additionally, the
individual or family account holder cannot be covered by any other
insurance, except that which is specifically allowed under this
section.47
The out-of-pocket cap limits the amount, other than premiums,
that an individual or family may be required to pay "out-of-pocket"
for copayments and other covered expenses in any one year. The
42. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
43. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1997).
44. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
45. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(ii). This requirement has been interpreted by Revenue Ruling 97-
20, which holds that individual deductibles cannot be aggregated under a family plan and still
qualify as a high-deductible account. Rev. Rul. 97-20, 1997-19 I.R.B. 4. However, plans that
are established before November 1, 1997, will qualify for this program, even if they aggregate
individual deductibles, but only until their renewal and this safe harbor will not extend past
December 31, 1998. Id.
The survey of insurers, completed in December 1977, found that some of the plans being
offered by insurers as "MSA-Qualified" have features that are not allowed under or are
inconsistent with the requirements of § 220. See WESTAT, supra note 8. The features noted
were:
Copayments for physician office visits; first dollar coverage for preventive care where
such care is not a state mandated benefit; cost sharing for out-of-network services above
the out-of-pocket maximum; embedded deductibles. (Approximately one-third of
qualified plans were not structured in accordance with the Treasury ruling on embedded
deductibles, which allowed a grace period through November 1997).
Id.
46. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(A)(iii)(II).
47. I.R.C. § 220(c)(3).
Permitted insurance. - The term "permitted insurance" means-
(A) Medicare supplemental insurance,
(B) insurance if substantially all of the coverage provided under such insurance
relates to-
(i) liabilities incurred under workers' compensation laws,
(ii) tort liabilities
(iii) liabilities relating to ownership or use of property, or
(iv) such other similar liabilities as the Secretary may specify by regulations.
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expenses that apply toward the out-of-pocket limit are not mandated
by this provision and will vary from policy to policy.48
Contributions by an employer to an MSA are excluded from the
employee's income, as are an MSA's earnings.49 Contributions to an
MSA made by the account holder are deductible from the account
holder's gross income."0 Annual contributions to an individual's
MSA receiving preferential tax treatment are limited to sixty-five
percent of the annual deductible for an individual account,"1 and
seventy-five percent of the annual deductible for a family account.
5 2
Either the employer or the account holder can make contributions to
the MSA, but both cannot make contributions in the same year."
The amount that an individual or family must spend in the initial
year or years could exceed the maximum allowable contribution to the
MSA.54 Because of the limits placed on contributions, if the deduct-
ible is reached each year, part of the deductible (at least twenty-five to
thirty-five percent, depending on whether the MSA is a family or
individual account, or more, depending on the level of individual or
employer contribution) must be paid out of after-tax income. Further,
any expense beyond the deductible not covered by the insurance would
have to be paid out of after-tax income, up to the out-of-pocket limit.
Proponents argue that although an individual MSA holder may
spend more than a traditional policy's deductible in any one year, over
time the savings and expenditures will balance out.5" If the plan is
48. As will be fully discussed later in this Comment, this may lead to expenses well in
excess of this "limit" and unexpectedly high costs to the individual or family MSA holder. See
infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
49. I.R.C. § 220(e). Currently, most plans simply bear interest, but with increasing
popularity they could come to be invested in much the same way that IRAs are now. Mellon
Bank has even introduced a MSA that allows the holder to invest the funds in any legal
investment vehicle. See Banks, Insurers Stampede to Sign MSA Participants, TREASURY
MANAGERS REP., Feb. 14, 1997, available at 1997 WL 8644698.
50. I.R.C. § 220(a). See also I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219.
51. I.R.C. § 220(b)(2)(A). This means that an individual MSA could receive contributions
between $975 and $1,463. This maximum contribution is calculated on a monthly availability
basis. I.R.C. § 220(b)(1).
52. I.R.C. § 220(b)(2)(B). A family MSA can receive a maximum annual contribution of
between $2,250 and $3,375. This maximum contribution is calculated on a monthly basis. I.R.C.
§ 220(b)(1).
53. I.R.C. § 220(b)(5).
54. This is because annual contributions are limited to less than the amount of the
deductible. I.R.C. § 220(b)(2)(A) and (B). See also Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Medical Savings Accounts
Offer Benefits, Risks, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at Cl.
55. Because over 73% of the insured population spends less than $500 per year and the
individual contribution that could be made to the individual MSA with the lowest deductible is
$975 per year, over time it is unlikely that the individual's medical expenses would exceed the
maximum allowable contributions to a MSA. See Jeffrey, supra note 54, at Cl. Therefore, if the
[Vol. 21:12171224
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started by younger people, it may even result in substantial accumulat-
ed savings. 6 Additionally, proponents note that the purpose of an
MSA is to create a fund to pay the high deductible, if necessary.5 7
Distributions from an MSA for qualified medical expenses are
excluded from income for tax purposes; 8 a qualified medical expense
under this provision is any expense that is deductible under Internal
Revenue Code § 213(d). 9 The MSA funds may be used, tax free, for
any qualified medical expense of the account holder, the spouse of the
account holder, or any dependent of the account holder, "to the extent
that such amounts are not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise.""
Although the MSA funds can be withdrawn and used for any
other purpose, the amount of the withdrawal will be subject to income
tax and a fifteen percent penalty.6 However, no reporting require-
ment currently exists.62  Therefore, unqualified expenditures will not
be discovered unless the account holder reports them or is audited.
Self-employed people receive an additional benefit under this
provision, as all of the money contributed to a MSA, up to the
maximum contribution, is excluded from income, while only forty
maximum contribution is made, on average there would be at least several hundred dollars of
savings placed in the MSA each year. Id. To illustrate, one estimate has been made that if
$1,800 were put in an MSA each year and $1,000 in medical expenses were taken each year
beginning when the account holder was twenty, by the time the account holder turns 65 the
account would have accumulated $331,941. Id. Additionally, in 1989, 85% of insured people
filed claims for less than $2,000 for medical care. Id.
56. Id. See also The Economy Perspective Real Health-Care Reform, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Oct. 16, 1996, at B1.
57. See Paul Ferrara, Medical Savings Accounts: Not Just for Healthy, CONSUMERS' RES.
MAG., May 1, 1996, at 16.
58. I.R.C. § 220(0(1) (West Supp. 1997).
59. I.R.C. § 220(d)(2)(A). However, health insurance, except for coverage for continuation
required under federal law, qualified long-term care, or while the account holder is receiving state
or federal unemployment compensation, may not be purchased out of the MSA. I.R.C.
§ 220(d)(2)(B). Allowing the use of the MSA funds for any qualified medical expenses means that
the MSA may be used for expenses that do not apply to the deductible or out-of-pocket limit of
the high-deductible plan, which could result in greater out-of-pocket expenses than were
anticipated. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 24, at 3.
For example, dental and vision services, while qualified medical expenses under I.R.C. § 213, may
not be covered services under a high-deductible health insurance plan. Id. If they are not
covered, these expenditures would not count toward the out-of-pocket caps, so total expenses
could be higher than expected. Id. This is a problem that will be further discussed later in this
Comment, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text; however, its solution is beyond this
Comment's scope.
60. I.R.C. § 220(d)(2)(A).
61. I.R.C. § 220(0)(4).
62. See I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219 (the trustee or custodian is not required to
determine whether the distributions are used for medical expenses).
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percent of the costs of traditional health insurance are deductible from
income.63 Individuals who would otherwise pay medical expenses out-
of-pocket and use their MSA funds on their medical care may also
receive an added benefit. Generally, only qualified medical expenses
in excess of seven and a half percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income are deductible, 64 but contributions made by an account holder
to an MSA are fully deductible from gross income.6" Distributions
from the MSA for qualified medical expenses are exempt from
taxation.66 Unused MSA balances carry over from year to year and
continue to accrue tax-free interest. Additionally, like an IRA, money
in the MSA may be withdrawn without penalty, subject only to regularincome tax, at retirement. Moreover, MSAs receive more favorable
treatment at the death of the account holder than IRAs.6"
Two significant shortcomings of the MSA provision are its failure
to require that MSA funds be used to pay for services or expenses not
covered by insurance, and its failure to require that expenses paid for
with MSA funds apply toward the deductible and out-of-pocket limits
of the high-deductible health plan. These shortcomings may cause
higher-than-expected health care expenses for the account holder.
Because medical expenses the account holder pays for do not have
to apply toward either the deductible or the out-of-pocket limit, the
account holder may experience higher-than-expected costs. Because
there is no requirement that the MSA be used to pay for medical
expenses, they may be paid for with after-tax dollars. This means that
MSA holders may collect tax-free earnings on the account, using this
simply as a tax shelter, which is contrary to its purpose.69
D. Arguments for and Against MSAs
Strong arguments have been raised both for and against giving
MSAs a tax-preferred status. One argument against providing a tax-
63. I.R.C. § 162(l)(1)(B). This is also a benefit for self-employed people because prior to
the HIPAA only 30% of the costs of a self-employed person's health insurance were deductible.
I.R.C. § 162(1). The 40% deduction will be increasing over the next several years to 80%. I.R.C.
§ 162(l)(1)(B).
64. I.R.C. § 213.
65. I.R.C. § 220(a).
66. I.R.C. § 220(f)(1).
67. I.R.C. § 220(f)(4)(C) (the additional tax does not apply to payments or distributions
made after the account holder reaches the age specified in § 1811 of the Social Security Act).
68. Compare I.R.C. § 220(f)(8) with I.R.C. § 408(d).
69. As previously noted, even if some, but not all, of the annual contribution is used for




preferred treatment for MSAs is that MSAs are solely for the "healthy
and the wealthy." Opponents fear that MSAs will cause adverse
selection, resulting in a deterioration of the traditional health insurance
pool, making health insurance so cost-prohibitive for those who most
need medical insurance that they will be unable to obtain it.
71
Proponents of tax-preferred MSAs believe that MSAs will
encourage savings, encourage more active participation in the health
insurance market by consumers, and lessen administrative costs.
7'
Proponents claim that increased participation should result in an
overall reduction in health care costs.7 1 Savings will be encouraged
by allowing tax-free accumulation of unused contributions and the
earnings thereon. Consumers will be encouraged to be more cost-
conscious and to take a more active role in the use of health care
dollars because they will be spending their own money, rather than
that of the insurance company.
73
Opponents counter that consumers may not have sufficient
information to change or control much of their health care spending.74
Consumers often do not have an opportunity to gather prices or shop
competitively for medical services. An injured person on the way to
an emergency room is not likely to ask the ambulance driver which
hospital is cheaper. The same is true of services once the patient is at
the hospital. Additionally, individual consumers may not have enough
bargaining power to receive better prices from doctors or hospitals.75
MSA-spawned adverse selection would defeat the primary purpose
of health insurance, which is to pool the risks and reduce the cost to
each insured individual.76 Adverse selection in this context would
70. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, supra note 24, at i; and Mark V. Pauly and
John C. Goodman, Incremental Steps Toward Health System Reform, 14 HEALTH AFF. 125, 136
(1995).
71. See supra note 55.
72. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249; GOODMAN &
MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 22; and Emmett B. Keeler,
et al., Can Medical Savings Accounts for the Nonelderly Reduce Health Care Costs? 275 JAMA
1666, 1667 (June 5, 1996) available in Westlaw, AMA-JNLS Database.
73. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249; GOODMAN &
MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 22; and Keeler et al., supra
note 72, at 1667.
74. William C. Hsiao, Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons From Singapore, 14 HEALTH AFF.
260, 266 (1995).
75. Id.
76. See Len M. Nichols, Medical Savings Accounts and Risk Segmentation, 14 HEALTH AFF.
275, 275-76 (1995).
1998] 1227
Seattle University Law Review
also defeat one of the primary purposes of the HIPAA, which is to
increase the affordability of health insurance.
77
However, the use of MSAs has not been widespread enough to
date to determine whether they will cause adverse selection in the
health insurance market. Additionally, the favorable results experi-
enced by Singapore, discussed below, may not be the same here
because of both cultural differences and structural differences in plan
design.7"
Opponents also fear that MSAs will cause a reduction in the
general level of health of account holders. They believe that MSAs
may create improper incentives; that people may have less incentive to
obtain preventive health care because they will be spending their own
money. Decreased use of preventive care could result in a reduction
in the general level of the health of account holders."
However, some MSA users say that they have used preventive
care services which they would not otherwise have used because their
employer-provided MSA had the money to pay for those services."0
They claim that traditional health plans provide less incentive to use
preventive care because the cost of preventive care is less than the
deductible and therefore has to be paid for out-of-pocket."1
If state law requires coverage for preventive care without a
deductible, this provision will not disqualify a high-deductible
insurance policy that allows preventive care without a deductible.8 2
Proponents believe that many people, particularly low-income, single
parents, cannot afford the out-of-pocket costs for preventive care under
a traditional plan. Proponents also claim that lower use of preven-
tive care is not necessarily bad, if the reduction in utilization is the
result of more thoughtful and informed choices about what kinds of
treatment and health care are really necessary for the individual
insured.84
77. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
78. Hsiao, supra note 74, at 266. See also infra notes 132-52 and accompanying text. See
also THOMAS A. MASSARO, M.D., PH.D. & Yu-NING WONG, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS, POLICY REPORT No. 203, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: THE
SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE (1996) (visited Mar. 6,1997) <http://www.public-policy.org>.
79. MARK V. PAULY, AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: Do Two
WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT? 3 (1994). See also Bond et al., supra note 39.
80. Review & Outlook: Consumer-First Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at A-14
(editorial).
81. Id.
82. I.R.C. § 220(c)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
83. Review & Outlook, supra note 80.
84. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249; GOODMAN &
MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 22.
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John Goodman, a leading proponent of MSAs, has argued that,
because of the flexibility available for provider and treatment selection
with a MSA, even sick people could be better off with a MSA.8"
Unlike HMOs and preferred provider plans, most high-deductible
plans do not require that the insured go to specific providers to get
treatment.86 This allows the individual enormous freedom in select-
ing treatments and providers.87
However, opponents believe that consumers may be confused
because they may not realize the limitations of their high-deductible
policy.88 Although money can be withdrawn from the Medical
Savings Account for any medical expense that is qualified under section
213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code,89 many qualified medical
expenses may not apply toward either the policy's deductible or out-of-
pocket cap.9" The result could be much higher cash expenses than
the account holder expected to incur.91
Additionally, the policy may have waiting periods for coverage of
some services or procedures; if one of these services or treatments is
received before the end of the waiting period the expense will not apply
to the deductible. Also, some procedures or services may be excluded.
The cost of excluded services and procedures will not apply to the
deductible, even though the expenses may legitimately be paid for out
of the MSA.
The account holder is also required to determine whether expenses
paid for with MSA funds are qualified medical expenses. 2 The
trustee or institution that holds the funds does not monitor whether
distributions are for qualified medical expenses.93 In one sense, this




88. Jeffrey, supra note 54. These expenses would still be deductible under I.R.C. § 213 to
the extent that total qualified medical expenses exceed 7.5% of the account holder's adjusted gross
income.
89. I.R.C. § 220(f)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (I.R.C. § 213(d) allows deduction for medical
expenses).
90. Jeffrey, supra note 54. See also Steven Findlay, Experimental Health Plan Makes Its
Debut, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1997, available at 1997 WL 6991102. Section 213(d) allows
deduction for such items as vision and dental care, both of which are generally excluded from
high-deductible health plans. I.R.C. § 213(d).
91. Jeffrey, supra note 54. These expenses would still be deductible under § 213 to the
extent that total qualified medical expenses exceed 7.5% of the account holders' adjusted gross
income. I.R.C. § 213(a).
92. I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219.
93. Id. However, the Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion to require the trustee to
make reports on the "contributions, distributions and any other matters the Secretary determines
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is good because it will lessen administrative costs. However, this also
means that there is no effective way to track MSA distributions.
Opponents also argue that MSAs will result in an inequitable
distribution of expenses. People with greater disposable income and
an MSA may choose to continue to accumulate tax-free earnings,
opting instead to pay for medical expenses out of after-tax income,
using the account as a tax shelter.94 On the other hand, people with
lower disposable income likely will not have the option of obtaining
this tax benefit. Moreover, this inequity will be even more severe if
adverse selection results, because the cost of insurance will be increased
to those people remaining in the traditional insurance market.
E. Actual Experience of Firms Offering MSAs to Employees
Between 1,000 and 1,300 companies already offer plans combining
an MSA and a high-deductible insurance plan to their employees.9
Many of these companies, including Forbes, Inc., and Golden Rule
Insurance Company, have reported that the use of high-deductible
health plans coupled with MSAs have resulted in greater savings for
employees, have reduced the employer's insurance costs, and have
increased the employees' satisfaction with the health insurance options
available.96
Golden Rule Insurance, the insurance company leading the drive
for favorable treatment of MSAs, estimates that currently 25,000
people have the plans, without the tax-preferred status.97 Many of
the companies offering MSAs and high-deductible insurance have
experienced reductions in their insurance costs; these savings can be
returned to the employees.9"
However, Mark Pauly, a health economist, believes that the results
from Forbes and similar plans are not comparable to a program that
provides a preferential tax treatment for MSAs.99 These results are
appropriate." I.R.C. § 220(h). These reports are to be made at the time and in the manner
required by the Secretary. Id.
94. 142 CONG. REc. H6684-05 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (floor Comments of Rep. Jim
McDermott).
95. See Ron Panko, Insurers Must Move Fast on MSA Opportunity, 97 BEST'S REV. - LIFE-
HEALTH INS. ED. *5, Oct. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 13935394. See also Medical Savings
Accounts: Why Do They Work?, BENEFITS Q., 2d Qtr. 1996, at 78-83, available in LEXIS.
96. See Keeler et al., supra note 72, at 1667-68.
97. See Elizabeth Neus, Will Savings Cure Health-Care Ills? A Savings Account Teamed with
an Income Tax Break Has Been Touted as Medical- Care Protection for Small Business; Many of the
Potential Beneficiaries Are Skeptical, THE MORNING NEWS TRIB., Dec. 29, 1996, at F3.
98. Review & Outlook, supra note 80.
99. PAULY, supra note 79, at 3.
[Vol. 21:12171230
Medical Savings Accounts
not comparable because preferential tax treatment of MSAs will change
the account holder's spending incentives."' °
F Simulations Involving MSAs as an Insurance Option
Although there has not been widespread testing of MSAs in the
insurance market, several simulations have attempted to gauge the
effects that MSAs may have. The two primary simulations were
conducted by RAND' and the American Academy of Actuaries
(AAA). 102 Both of these simulations based their findings primarily
on the data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.0 3
After updating the data from the Health Insurance Experiment,
the RAND simulation found that health-care costs would be reduced
by between zero and thirteen percent if everyone switched to an
MSA.10 4  However, if not everyone selected an MSA, health-care
costs would be reduced by two percent or less. 0 ' According to these
results, the current demonstration program may not significantly
reduce health care costs because tax-preferred MSAs are not even
available to most of the insured population.
Based on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment data, its own
experience, and other data sets, the AAA simulation found that the
effect of MSAs on individual spending will largely depend on whether
people view their MSAs as savings or as insurance.0 6 This simula-
tion found that if MSAs were optional, insurance premiums for
traditional low-deductible health insurance could be increased by as
much as sixty-one percent. 7  Under the current demonstration
program, MSAs are not only optional, but they are also unavailable to
most people. Therefore, it is possible, according to the AAA
100. Id.
101. See generally Keeler et al., supra note 72.
102. See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note
24.
103. See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE AND THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP,
FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1986)
(providing a complete and comprehensive discussion of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
and its findings; the experiment collected over 20,000 person-years of data). However, the
American Academy of Actuaries simulation did look at, and to some extent incorporate, some
other data sets. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 24,
at 24-27.
104. See Keeler et al., supra note 72, at 1668.
105. Id.
106. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 24, at
10.
107. Id. at 9. This conclusion was drawn from an assumption that if everyone was free to
choose a traditional or a high deductible plan 75% would choose the high deductible plan. Id.
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simulation, that traditional health insurance costs could increase
substantially.
These simulation results indicate that unrestrained selection of
MSAs may cause little change in overall health care costs, particularly
if individuals view their MSAs as insurance. However, they also
indicate that if adverse selection occurs the effects on traditional, low-
deductible insurance cost could be substantial. These. simulations
indicate that the demonstration program as designed is unlikely, to
result in any significant savings because of the enrollment restrictions
and the optional nature of the MSAs.
G. The Demonstration Program and Its Study
Because the MSA demonstration program does not allow
employees of larger businesses to participate in tax-preferred MSAs,
the study to be conducted is unlikely to be representative of the overall
population. Because such a large portion of the population will be
excluded from participation in this program, the results of the study
could be skewed. According to the Rand and AAA simulations,
10 8
the actual effect on the health insurance market will depend upon the
proportion of people who select MSAs instead of traditional health
insurance. One reason the study's findings about selection of MSAs
may be inaccurate is that small employers often offer only one
plan,"0 9 while larger employers may offer greater choices regarding
insurance plans."0  The results will not be accurate if members of
the excluded groups have a different incidence of selection than
members of the included groups. There could also be very different
levels of employer funding of MSAs between large and small employ-
ers."' Therefore, unless it is an open demonstration program, the
actual effects on the health insurance and health care markets may not
be truly reflected, and the study's selection and adverse selection
results could be inaccurate.
Another potential problem with the study is that it will only be
carried on for four years. This may not be a sufficient duration to
108. See Keeler et al., supra note 72; AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 24, at 23.
109. Michael A. Morrisey, Gail A. Jensen, and Robert J. Morlock, Small Employers and the
Health Insurance Market, 13 HEALTH AFF. 149, 152 (1994). See also AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
ACTUARIES, MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT ACT OF 1995 3 (1995) [hereinafter AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
ACTUARIES: ANALYSIS].
110. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: ANALYSIS, supra note 109, at 3.
111. Len Nichols, Who Will Jump into the MSA Pond? Oct. 1, 1996 BUS. & HEALTH 47,
available at 1996 WL 8998404.
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allow observation of the long-term effects on health insurance and
health care costs.
Another flaw in this study may be its failure to require or provide
for a control group so that the effect of MSAs on traditional health
insurance and health care costs can be compared. 112 A restriction on
the geographic areas of availability would be one way that a control
group could be created." 3 Similar areas, with and without access to
tax-preferred MSAs, could be compared. This would allow a more
accurate determination of whether changes in health care and health
insurance costs were attributable to the availability of tax-preferred
MSAs or to other market forces. Another possibility would be simply
to require comparison with a similar group that chooses not to
participate in the MSA demonstration program. This solution would
be more difficult administratively. Regardless of the approach used,
a control group is necessary so that it will be possible to determine
whether any changes that occur in the insurance market are attributable
to the availability of tax-preferred MSAs.
Finally, under the demonstration program the number of MSAs
that may be formed is limited to 750,000."' Additional participants
will be allowed to establish MSAs with tax-preferred treatment only if
Congress acts to allow an increase in the number of participants, when
the interim cap is reached, when the overall cap is reached, or when
the program ends.1 Each account will only be counted once to
determine whether the cap has been reached, even if it covers a
family." 6  Because family accounts are counted only once as many
as 1.5 to 2 million people could be affected by the allowance of
750,000 tax-preferred MSAs. 7  This demonstration program could
112. Id.
113. See Iris J. Lav, MSA Demonstration: Research Suggests Controls Needed to Prevent
Adverse Affect on Insurance Market (visited Dec. 29, 1997) <http://epn.org/cbpp/cbmsa7.html>
(allowing participating companies only in a few states). Although creation of a control group by
use of geographic restrictions would be the simplest way to create a control group, the political
difficulties that could arise because of the potential perception that an advantage was being given
to one area and not to another could make such a division difficult.
114. I.R.C. § 220) (West Supp. 1997).
115. See supra note 5.
116. I.R.C. § 2206)(4)(D).
117. Nichols, supra note 111, at *17. However, people who obtain Medical Savings
Accounts during this demonstration program, under current law, are not forced to give them up
at the end of the program should Congress decide to discontinue the program because it proves
to be infeasible or unwise.
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affect as much as ten percent of the small group market, 18 but this
is only about one percent of the insured population. 9
A demonstration program as such should not affect too large a
segment of the population, and this MSA demonstration reaches only
a very small percentage of the total insured population. However,
because the percentage affected is small it may be difficult to accurately
gauge whether, and to what extent, adverse selection occurs, particular-
ly because there is no requirement that a control group also be studied.
Because of the small percentage of the insured population that will be
affected, the impact on health insurance rates and health care costs will
most likely be minimal, even if adverse selection results; it is question-
able whether the effects will even be discernible.1 21
The study's methodology and participation limits must be
changed for this study to satisfy its goals. Requiring a control group,
extending the study period to allow for observation of the long-term
effects, or allowing larger employers to participate would go a long way
toward solving the problems of this demonstration program and its
study of the effects MSAs will have on traditional health insurance
markets.
H. The Results So Far
Four competitive contracts were awarded by the GAO to firms
"with experience in health economics, health insurance, and actuarial
science. 121 Westat, a research firm, received the contract to com-
plete the insurer survey.1 22 Because the enrollment in this program
has been so limited, the insurer's survey is the only part of the study
that has begun.123  The remainder of the study will not begin until
enrollment reaches 375,000.124
Westat's findings were submitted to Congress on December 15,
1997,125 and the insurer survey will be repeated each year.
126
Westat's findings indicated that there are several reasons that
118. Nichols, supra note 11, at *9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Dec.
19, 1997).
122. Id.
123. GAO Shelves Demographics Survey, supra note 8.
124. Id. The GAO claimed it was "financially infeasible" to complete the survey with so
few participants. Id. The GAO has until January 1, 1999, to present a report of the findings to
Congress. 104 P.L. 191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2053 § 301(1) (1996).
125. WESTAT, supra note 8, at 2.
126. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 121.
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enrollment has been lower than expected. 127  These reasons include
findings that the commissions to insurance brokers and agents are
lower on qualified high-deductible insurance; more time is required to
educate consumers about the product than traditional indemnity
insurance programs because of the complexity of MSAs coupled with
high-deductible insurance; and the fact that this is a demonstration
program. 128  In spite of the slow initial enrollment, the survey
indicated that sales may be picking up.129 The survey also noted that
insurers had responded quickly, often with little market research,
making qualified plans available in all states. 3 ° Interestingly, the
survey found that the target market was more highly compensated
persons, such as the partners in large law firms. 3' This finding
suggests that adverse selection may be a real possibility, particularly in
light of the targeted marketing of qualified plans.
However, since the remainder of the study is not being conducted
at this time, it is not currently possible to tell what the effects actually
are. One of the reasons that individuals may be reluctant to participate
is that this is a demonstration program. Therefore, if Congress decides
to allow tax-preferred MSAs on an unlimited basis, participation could
dramatically increase. This could result in unforeseen problems, unless
the study is completed and deals with all possible negative effects that
MSAs may have on the traditional health insurance market.
I. Singapore's Experience with Mandatory MSAs for All Citizens
MSAs are not completely untried. In addition to being offered,
without tax benefits, by some larger companies, 3 2 they have been
used in Singapore for a number of years.'33 However, Singapore's
program is substantially different-all workers must participate.
134
In spite of this important difference, and even without taking into
127. WESTAT, supra note 8, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Id. The study found that many companies had simply modified existing plans to meet
the requirements of the demonstration program, which allowed quick entry. Id. The study also
found that some of the plans being marketed as qualified plans appeared not to meet the
requirements set out in the program. Id. In particular, the study found that many of the plans
had embedded deductibles, which the IRS ruled would not qualify for tax preferred status. Id.
131. Id. at 8-10. The study noted that although they might seemingly not qualify because
of the size of the organization they are eligible because for tax purposes they are treated as self-
employed. Id.
132. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
133. Hsaio, supra note 74, at 262.
134. Id.
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account possibly substantial cultural differences, examining Singapore's
experience may be instructive.
To combat the rising costs of health insurance, Singapore created
a new insurance program in 1984, which makes use of what are called
Medisave accounts. 135  Over time it became apparent that additional
coverage was needed for longer-than-average hospital stays. 136  As a
result, the government created an optional insurance pool that pays for
hospitalization costs for each hospital stay that is longer than aver-
age. 137
Contributions to Medisave are mandatory for all workers.138
Contributions are split between the employer and the employee and
range from six to eight percent of an employee's salary.1 39  The
Medisave account, like an MSA under the demonstration program
here, is available to pay for medical expenses. 140  The funds in the
Medisave account may be used for the worker/account holder's
medical expenses, or those of a family member of the worker/account
holder.14 1  Unlike the HIPAA's demonstration program, a Medisave
account is created for all workers and contributions must be made by
all employers and employees, regardless of whether the worker elects
to purchase the optional catastrophic insurance. 142
Although Singapore's average length of stay and type of treatment
are comparable to those experienced by other countries, 43 these plans
have not been entirely successful in stemming the increase in health
135. Id. at 261. These accounts are similar to the MSAs being discussed throughout this
Comment. Originally, these accounts were the sole insurance Singapore's citizens had; Medisave
was not coupled with high-deductible insurance at the outset. See also GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE,
PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 598-605; GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING
HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note IS, at Appendix B, 34-37; and Thomas A. Massaro and Yu-
Ning Wong, Positive Experience with Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore, 14 HEALTH AFF.
267, 267-72 (1995) (discussing Singapore's experience with Medisave).
136. Hsiao, supra note 74, at 262.
137. Massaro & Wong, supra note 135, at 267.
138. Hsiao, supra note 74, at 261. However, participation in the catastrophic insurance is
optional. Id. at 262.
139. Id. at 261. To a certain extent, this insurance is similar to the high-deductible plan
that is discussed in this Comment, except that Singapore's insurance insures on a per
hospitalization incident, while the United States' demonstration program insures based on an
annual deductible. Singapore's insurance fund is called Medishield. id. at 262.
140. Id. at 261.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 261-62.
143. Massaro & Wong, supra note 135, 268-69.
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care costs.'4 4 Singapore's health care costs have increased at a rate
slightly above the rate of increase in its gross domestic product.'45
It is not clear, however, whether similar programs elsewhere will
experience the same or similar results.'46 There are major differences
between the cultures of the United States and Singapore that may affect
the results, 4 7 particularly the differences in the respective savings
rates and the citizens' education about, and interest in, preventive
health care.'48
Additionally, Singapore's Medisave program is substantially
different from the MSA demonstration program that Congress has
adopted in that Singapore's program is mandatory for all workers.14
On the other hand, the United States' MSA demonstration program
allows only some people to participate, and participation for those who
are eligible is completely optional. Also, Singapore's optional
catastrophic insurance coverage is per hospitalization, and both
incidental expenses and outpatient treatment are completely exclud-
ed. ' ° Under the United States' MSA demonstration program, the
high-deductible plans have a large annual deductible that applies to
inpatient and outpatient treatment, as well as to many incidental
expenses.
The differences between the two types of insurance may create
very different incentives. Under Singapore's program there is a
financial incentive to have a low number of treatment episodes,
regardless of their total cost.'' However, under the United States'
MSA demonstration program, once the deductible and out-of-pocket
limits have been reached, the financial incentive to keep health care
costs down disappears because the high-deductible insurance will pay
all covered expenses.' 2
But despite both the program and cultural differences, it may be
instructive that Singapore has not experienced a reduction in overall
health care costs. Because participation in Medisave is mandatory for
all workers in Singapore and health care costs have not been reduced,
as the AAA and RAND simulations suggest may be possible for the
144. Hsiao, supra note 74, at 264.
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id. at 264. See also Massaro & Wong, supra note 135, at 271.
147. Hsaio, supra note 74, at 266.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 261.
150. Id. at 262.
151. See Massaro & Wong, supra note 135, at 270.
152. Id.
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United States with MSAs, the question arises whether any benefit will
likely result from the allowance of tax-preferred MSAs. The fact that
a mandatory program has not reduced health care costs suggests that
an optional allowance, which simulations predicted could even raise
costs, may not create the reduction in health care costs that proponents
claim it will.
III. MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, HEALTH POLICY,
AND THE TAx CODE
While debate whether to expand, continue to allow, or eliminate
a tax-preferred treatment for MSAs continues,"13 the real issue is
much more basic. The real issue is what role the tax code should play
in the development of health policy, and further, how the tax code
should be used to affect health policy.
A. Health Policy Issues
The government may want to encourage the private purchase of
health insurance for several reasons, including reduction of overall
health expenditures and reduction of the government's cost of health
care.1"4 One way the government can encourage private purchase of
health insurance is through the tax code.
The pressure to reduce government spending creates a strong
incentive for government to encourage people to obtain private health
insurance. Increased purchase of private health insurance distributes
the cost of health care more evenly throughout society and places less
of the burden on the government's shoulders."'5 However, if the
private purchase of health insurance is to be encouraged through the
153. See infra note 203.
154. Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax
Treatment of Employer Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1995)
(advocating that the current tax treatment of health insurance be redesigned, allowing everyone
a tax deduction for the purchase of health insurance, rather than only allowing deduction and
exclusion from income for employer provided health benefits). The author includes as reasons
for a redesign that the government may wish to encourage the purchase of private health
insurance, a more equitable distribution of health care costs to recipients, and a reduction of
forced poverty because of catastrophic illness. Id.
155. Id. at 1230, 1235. Health care is often seen as a right in this country and to some
extent everyone has access to health-care services. Id. at 1232 (discussing forms of access that are
available even to the uninsured). However, in many instances, only emergency health care is
available to an indigent or low-income person. Id. This is not economically efficient. Emergency
care for uninsured and indigent persons is paid for by some combination of depleting the person's




use of taxation and spending policies, the question becomes how this
should be accomplished.
Providing favorable tax treatment for MSAs is one means that has
been suggested to reduce the overall costs of health care throughout the
economy.156 The argument is that consumers spending their own
money will become more conscious of the actual cost of health care.
This will encourage more thoughtful spending, resulting in reduced
overall health care costs."5 7  However, whether consumers have
sufficient ability to gather information on prices, or the bargaining
power to affect prices enough to cause any real cost reduction to occur,
has been questioned.
15 8
Most people would agree that a program that increases cost
consciousness and encourages thoughtful spending, resulting in an
overall cost reduction, creates a social benefit. Therefore, if MSAs
accomplish what proponents claim they will, it may be sound policy to
encourage a reduction in health care costs through the use of tax-
preferred MSAs. However, before deciding whether MSAs, coupled
with high-deductible insurance, are a form of health care coverage that
should be encouraged by the use of favorable tax treatment, there are
a number of risks that should be considered.
First, although in theory an employer will place the savings that
result from purchasing high-deductible insurance in the MSA, there is
no requirement that the employer do so. Additionally, it is possible
that the employer will not experience savings as great as the increase
in the deductible.15 9 Therefore, a person with an MSA could face
much higher expenses that would have to be paid out of after-tax
income than were possible under a traditional insurance plan or HMO
if the employer chooses not to make a contribution equal to the
difference in deductibles. 160
The potential increase in out-of-pocket expenses with a high-
deductible plan may create a particularly severe hardship for low-wage
earners. A low-wage earner probably cannot afford this increase in
out-of-pocket expenses or to make contributions to an MSA. Further,
156. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
157. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER, supra note 19, at 249-51; GOODMAN
& MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 15, at 22-23.
158. Hsiao, supra note 74, at 260.
159. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 24, at 9-10.
This may not be true if the business is located in a region such as California with high health
insurance costs. See, e.g., GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS,
supra note 15, at 10.
160. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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if the employer makes only a small contribution each year, this
problem may be exacerbated because the employee cannot make a
contribution in the same year that the employer makes a contribu-
tion. T"
Second, because of the increase in deductible without a require-
ment that the employer contribute to the MSA, some people may be
left with inferior coverage relative to their previous coverage. As noted
above, even if all the savings from the purchase of high-deductible
insurance policies are placed in the employees' MSAs, the savings
relative to a traditional insurance plan or HMO may not equal the
increase in the deductible unless the employee and employer are
located in one of the more expensive areas for insurance, such as
California.'62
Because an employer is not required to make any contribution
whatsoever to the MSA, an employee may have a much greater risk
and no means to pay the higher deductible. This could result in more
people spending down their assets in order to qualify for publicly-
assisted health care such as Medicaid, resulting in increased public
costs in the form of lower individual economic worth and higher public
health care payments.'63 These risks seem contrary to the HIPAA's
goal of increasing the affordability of health insurance.
The current use of tax policy to provide an incentive for the
formation of MSAs is misguided because of the lack of available
information regarding the potential harms. The risk of adverse
selection and reduction in coverage for some currently insured people
makes it possible that the intended reductions in the costs of health
care to society and the government may not occur. However, because
this is only a demonstration program, it can be terminated if the actual
effects are negative.
161. See I.R.C. § 220(b)(5) (West Supp. 1997).
162. See, e.g., AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES: COST IMPLICATIONS, supra note
24, at 8-9; Goodman & Musgrave, Controlling Health Care Costs, supra note 15, at 9-10.
163. See generally Joondeph, supra note 154, at 1236-38 (discussing these risks in the context
of people who do no not have insurance; however, this is analogous to the situation of having
inadequate insurance). See also JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5-7 (1987)
(discussing equity and efficiency as primary goals of tax policy).
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B. Tax Policy and the Medical Savings Account
Demonstration Program
Equity, simplicity, and efficiency have been enunciated as primary
goals of federal tax policy."' The Medical Savings Account provi-
sion fails to meet each of these goals to some extent. As enacted, this
provision will create both horizontal and vertical inequity, will require
complex reporting and record keeping, and, at least in most respects,
will be economically inefficient.
1. Equity
There are two components to equity: vertical equity and
horizontal equity. Vertical equity refers to situations in which
individuals with higher incomes pay proportionally higher taxes.
Horizontal equity refers to situations in which similarly situated
individuals are treated similarly.
a. Vertical Equity
Vertical equity is a feature of a progressive tax system. It requires
that those with higher incomes who can afford to pay more should pay
more in taxes than those with lower incomes; that is, individuals with
greater earnings ought to pay proportionally more than individuals with
lower earnings.'65
As designed, the MSA provision is vertically inequitable. This
provision is a tax expenditure, which by definition is vertically
inequitable.'66  The effects of this provision on people with greater
earnings will differ from the effects on those people with lesser
earnings in terms of tax paid. The difference will be similar to that
resulting from IRAs, which are another tax expenditure.'
67
Assuming no contributions to the MSA by the employer,
individuals with higher earnings will have greater ability to make the
maximum contribution to their MSA than will those with lower
164. See Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 747
(1995). However, in some discussions as many as seven categories of analysis have been
articulated. Id. (citing Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 567, 568 (1965)).
165. PAULY, supra note 79, at S.
166. Tax expenditures, because of marginal tax rates, are vertically inequitable. Tax
expenditures result in greater tax benefit to higher income levels than lower, the opposite of
vertical equity's requirement. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME
TAx THEORY AND POLICY, 293-95 (1989).
167. PAULY, supra note 79, at 11-12.
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earnings. Therefore, those with higher earnings will have a greater
opportunity to experience the tax benefits available under this
provision than will those with lower earnings. As noted previously,
where an employer funds an MSA, some individuals have claimed they
are more likely to use some services, such as preventive care, because
the money was available in the MSA.168
Additionally, the requirement that comparable contributions be
made on behalf of highly-compensated employees to those made on
behalf of nonhighly-compensated employees does not deal with the
vertical inequity arising between those who work for companies that
have mostly highly-paid employees compared to a company where
almost everyone works for minimum wage. Moreover, employers of
more highly-compensated workers may be more willing to make
contributions to an MSA than are employers of lower-paid workers.
To some extent, this is dealt with by the requirement that employers
make comparable contributions to all employees' MSAs.'69
The vertical inequity might be reduced by adopting a tax credit
that would entitle each individual to a maximum credit amount.17 °
Another possible means of reducing the vertical inequity might be to
limit the deduction to the amount of the deductible, with further
deductions allowed for contributions only after MSA funds are used for
qualified health care expenses. This would eliminate the possibility of
people with higher incomes using an MSA simply as a tax-free means
of accumulating savings.
b. Horizontal Equity
This provision will also result in horizontal inequity. Horizontal
equity requires that individuals who are in similar economic situations
be treated similarly and subject to similar taxes."7
This provision is horizontally inequitable because only people who
are employed by small businesses or are self-employed may participate
in this program; people employed by businesses with more than fifty
employees are not eligible."7 Therefore, this provision gives prefer-
ence to some, but not all, people who are economically similarly
situated, making a distinction based solely on the size of their place of
168. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
169. See I.R.C. § 4980E(d) (West Supp. 1997).
170. See Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits For Health Insurance and Medical
Savings Accounts, 14 HEALTH AFF. 126, 130-31, (1995). See also PAULY, supra note 79, at 19-
20.
171. PAULY, supra note 79, at 5.
172. I.R.C. §§ 220(c)(1)(A)(iii)(I)-(II).
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employment. This results in a situation that is not horizontally
equitable.
To eliminate the horizontal inequity that the MSA provision
creates, everyone, regardless of the size of their employer, would have
to be able to participate in the demonstration program, although the
total number of participants could still be limited."' This should
make the demonstration program and the study more representative of
the actual selection of MSAs while increasing the horizontal equity.
A final possible solution would be to allow a tax credit to
everyone who had some minimal form of health insurance.'74 This
would increase the equity of the tax treatment of insurance. 17S
However, this would entirely change the tax treatment of insurance.
A more limited version of this approach would be to give a tax credit
only to participants of this demonstration program, and only if certain
criteria in terms of policy type and contribution amount were met.
2. Simplicity
The features of this provision are unnecessarily complex and
defeat the goal that the tax system, which necessarily is somewhat
complex, be kept as simple as possible. Complex formulas are used to
determine whether, and under what circumstances, contributions may
be made and whether new MSAs may be created each year.
Each year, all MSA trustees must report to the IRS the number
of MSAs that have been formed. 76  The IRS must then determine
if the annual ceiling' 77 or overall ceiling'78 has been reached. If no
further MSAs may be created, the IRS must issue a notice.'79
Further, accounts do not have to be applied for, or registered with, the
173. It has also been argued that MSAs are more horizontally equitable than traditional
employer provided health care. See PAULY, supra note 79, at 19.
174. The idea of a tax credit for health insurance, rather than the current system of
deductions for the full amount of employer-provided insurance has been advocated as a means
of making the health insurance tax incentive system more equitable. See PAULY, supra note 79,
at 19-21.
175. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 2206)(4).
177. Annual caps are set out supra note 5.
178. As previously noted, the overall ceiling is 750,000. I.R.C. § 2200)(2). See I.R.C.
§ 2206)(4)(A) (requiring the trustee to report number of MSAs annually by August 1). See also
I.R.C. § 2206)(5) (requiring that the Secretary determine whether the limit has been reached by
October 1).
179. I.R.C. § 220(j)(5).
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IRS before they are opened."' 0 However, an MSA may be opened
until a notice has been issued that enrollment has been cut off.'
By changing the restrictions on MSAs, this provision could be
greatly simplified. Rather than have a limit on the number of MSAs
that can be created, it could have a durational limit on the tax
preference. The program could be opened up to anyone who wants to
participate, regardless of the size of the employer. This would reduce
the amount of tracking that is necessary. However, a durational limit
could increase the risks and costs to consumers who choose to switch
to MSAs. It might reduce the number of people willing to participate
in the demonstration program because Congress could decide not to
continue the preferential tax treatment of MSAs at the end of the
program. Participants in the program could then be forced to switch
insurance again. This problem, and its possible solutions, is further
discussed in Part IV.
A second possible simplification would be to eliminate or simplify
the formulas used to determine the number of accounts that can be
opened. The total number of participants could be limited and
enrollment would end at the time that limit was reached. This would
eliminate the annual caps. One way to accomplish this would be to
require either that the MSA holder apply to participate or that the
MSA trustee report each MSA which is opened.
A third possible simplification would be to simplify the rules
regarding who can make contributions and how much their contribu-
tions can be. The contribution limit could be made a flat dollar
amount, rather than a percentage of the deductible that depends on
whether it is an individual or family MSA. This contribution limit
would then be the only limit. Contributions would be allowed from
either the employee, the employer, or both, so long as the dollar limit
is not exceeded, as there is no apparent reason for this limitation.
Adopting any or all of these changes would increase certainty for
MSA holders and potential MSA holders. Further, the changes would
simplify administration of this program.
3. Efficiency
Finally, in most senses, this provision also fails to meet the goals
of efficiency. Although efficiency may be defined in many ways, it is
difficult to find a definition that would consider this program to be
efficient. The only exception is that MSAs may reduce the administra-
180. I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219.
181. Id. at 220.
1244 [Vol. 21:1217
Medical Savings Accounts
tive costs of insurance. 18 2  However, the reduction in administrative
costs of insurance may be offset by the burdens of record keeping and
reporting required of the trustee.
Because the number of accounts allowed to be created is limited
and because of the nature of the study to be done, there is a great deal
of record keeping required. Such record keeping will be costly. As
part of the record-keeping requirements, both the employee and the
trustee must file reports with the IRS. The employee must report the
dollar amount of contributions to an MSA, whether made by the
account holder or by the employer." 3 The employee must also keep
records of distributions for qualified medical expenses as well as report
any distributions that are not for qualified medical expenses. 4
Although the trustees have lower record-keeping and reporting
requirements, even for them the requirements are not insubstantial.
The trustee must report the number of MSAs,8 5 the name of the
account holder, the amount of contributions, 8 6 and the amount of
distributions from the MSA. 187  The trustee must also provide the
account holder with a 1099-MSA, a copy of which goes to the IRS,
that shows distributions from the MSA.
While some cross checks are probably necessary, there appears to
be excessive redundancy in the reporting requirements. However, in
spite of some redundancies and the requirement that trustees report on
distributions, trustees do not determine whether expenses are qualified
medical expenses or even identify the purpose of the distribution.8
It seems unnecessary and inefficient to require the employee and the
trustee to provide so much of the same information to the Internal
Revenue Service.189 For example, the information on the 1099-MSA
182. It has been estimated that these accounts, by allowing the patient to pay for small
medical bills without the doctor or health care provider having to complete claim forms, which
then have to be reviewed and paid by the insurance company, would substantially reduce the costs
of administration of insurance. One estimate of the savings that might be realized is a savings
of $33 billion per year. GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE, supra note
15, at 25-27. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that self-administered MSAs would result in
lower administrative costs for smaller claims. However, it would not eliminate all administrative
costs.
183. Contributions are deductible if made by the employee, I.R.C. § 220(a); if made by the
employer, contributions are excludable from income, I.R.C. § 220(b)(5).
184. The account holder must determine whether the distribution was for a qualified
medical expense. I.R.C. § 220(d)(2); I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219, 222.
185. I.R.C. § 220(X4)(A). This report is made on form 8851.
186. This report is made on form 5498-MSA.
187. This report is made on form 1099-MSA.
188. I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219.
189. However, double reporting is common. For example, the information provided to the
IRS by an employer on a W-2 form is also provided by the employee when filing a federal income
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(distributions) and the 5498-MSA (contributions and other informa-
tion), both of which are filed by the trustee, overlap to a large extent.
Additionally, the overlap with the information provided by the
employee is also substantial.
This inefficient use of resources might be cured by lessening the
administrative burden on everyone, including employees, trustees, and
the IRS. One way the administrative burden might be lessened is to
reduce some of the redundant reporting.19 Although trustees are
required to make a report of the distributions, 191 trustees are not
required to track expenditures.' However, at least some verification
of the propriety of expenditures should be required. Otherwise, the
only way that improper withdrawals will be discovered is during an
audit. This could either increase audit costs or allow people to get
away with improper spending of before-tax dollars. Both options are
inefficient as to the collection of revenues and reduction of administra-
tive costs. However, if trustees were required to track distributions
and determine whether they were used for qualified medical expenses
some or all of the potential reduction in administrative costs would be
lost. Further, this should not increase the administrative burden
because a record of expenditures will have to be maintained to
determine when the high deductible has been reached.
As a result of the preferential tax treatment that MSAs are given,
millions of dollars of revenues will be forgone each year. The Joint
Committee on Taxation estimated that the cost, in forgone revenues,
will exceed $134 million in 1997, increasing to $399 million in
2001.193
Giving these MSAs tax-preferred treatment is economically
inefficient, using a Pareto optimal definition of efficiency. 94 The
forgone revenues will result in a lessened ability of the government to
tax return.
190. Prospective Collection; Comment Request for Form 1099-MSA, 62 Fed. Reg. 2439
(1997). Prospective Collection; Comment Request for Form 5498-MSA, 62 Fed. Reg. 2440
(1997). The Department of the Treasury estimates that the 8851 reporting, record keeping, and
compilation will take a total of 1,540,000 hours; the estimated time necessary for record keeping
and completion of the 1099-MSA is a total of 45,000 hours per year; and the estimated time
required for record keeping and completion of the 5498-MSA is 60,000 hours. Submission to
0MB for Review; Comment Request, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,623 (1997).
191. Form 1099-MSA.
192. I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219.
193. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 104th CONG., COMPARISON OF ESTIMATE
BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS IN H.R. 3103, THE "HEALTH COVERAGE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY ACT OF 1996" (Comm. Print 1996).
194. Pareto optimal efficiency occurs when no one individual can be made better off without
making someone else worse off. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 164, at 750-52.
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fund other programs. However, the actual extent of the inefficiency is
uncertain because it is not clear which programs would lose, or not
receive, funding because of the foregone revenues. Therefore, although
some people may be better off with an MSA, others would be worse
off because spending will have to be reduced, taxes raised, or the
deficit increased to compensate for the forgone revenues."
IV. CHANGES IN THE MSA PROGRAM TO FURTHER HEALTH
POLICY GOALS THROUGH THE TAx CODE
Because this demonstration program does not meet the goals of
either health or tax policy, the tax preference granted by this demon-
stration should either be eliminated or redesigned. The effects on
revenue collection by the federal government, the effects on health
insurance overall, and the effects on particular forms of health care,
such as preventive care, could be evaluated more validly by changing
the parameters of the study.
The availability of MSAs needs to be expanded, at least as to the
status of the participants and perhaps as to the allowable number of
participants, to allow the study to accurately demonstrate the effects of
a tax-preferred MSA on the traditional health insurance market.
Enrollment needs to be open to everyone, including people employed
by larger businesses, to allow a more accurate determination of the
actual incidence of the selection of MSAs coupled with high deductible
health insurance.
Moreover, the overall cap on participants should be increased to
a number that would allow a determination, with some degree of
accuracy, of whether and to what extent adverse selection would result.
In raising the overall cap, a geographic distribution limit on enrollment
might significantly assist in obtaining accurate findings regarding
selection and adverse selection. However, geographic limits might
present political difficulties that could prevent creation of such a
program. But if such a limit is used, areas that are economically and
demographically similar could be compared. This would allow a more
accurate determination of the effects of MSAs on traditional insurance.
At the end of the study, if Congress determines that MSAs have
a detrimental effect on the health insurance market overall, Congress
could discontinue the preferential tax treatment altogether. People with
MSAs could be forced to return to the traditional health insurance
market. However, this risk is not as burdensome as it might seem.
195. DODGE, supra note 166, at 290-92. See also PAULY, supra note 79, at 3.
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Since this is a demonstration program, people should be aware of this
possibility when making the initial selection of an MSA.196
Although there is a risk that people forced back into the tradition-
al market will be unable to obtain replacement insurance because of
preexisting conditions, this risk exists any time insurance is changed.
This was a primary concern of the HIPAA's attempt to eliminate "job
lock." '197 If the tax-preferred treatment of MSAs is terminated at the
end of the program, Congress could use some of the same techniques
to insure that people who had selected MSAs would be able to obtain
new insurance without unduly burdensome waiting periods and
exclusions. If it so chooses, Congress could also limit the costs
associated with switching insurance due to preexisting conditions and
waiting periods.
A broader alternative to the current treatment of health insurance
generally is to provide tax credits for all taxpayers with insurance,
rather than allowing full tax deductions only for employer-provided
health care and only lesser deductions for self-employed people and
individuals.19" This would further the basic goal of encouraging
wiser use and lower health care expenditures. 199 Tax credits, instead
of a deduction by the employer and exclusion from income by the
employee, would remove current incentives to overinsure and
overspend on health care by redistributing the tax incentives.00 This
would result in greater equity in taxation and greater efficiency in the
level of health care purchased, because the improper incentives that
currently exist would be substantially removed." 1 A uniform tax
credit would allow individuals to select the type of health insurance
they feel is most economically efficient for them.0 2 However, this
would be a much broader change and would affect the treatment of all
health insurance, not just MSAs.
196. The survey of insurers noted that this is one of the factors that may be contributing
to the slower- than-expected sales of MSAs. See WESTAT, supra note 8, at 8-10.
197. Nichols, supra note 111, at *5. Job lock is created by an inability to either take health
insurance with the employee or to obtain new health insurance because of preexisting conditions.
198. See PAULY, supra note 79, at 19-22; Pauly & Goodman, supra note 170, at 126-39; and
David B. Kendall and Mark V. Pauly, Health Care Reform Starts with Tax Reform, WALL ST.
J., June 10, 1996, at A18.
199. See PAULY, supra note 79, at 19-22; Pauly & Goodman, supra note 170, at 126-29.
200. Pauly & Goodman, supra note 170, at 126-29.





MSAs may or may not have harmful effects on the traditional
health insurance market. Until the impacts of MSAs are clearer,
Congress should find a more equitable and certain method of testing
the effects MSAs will have on traditional health insurance markets and
health care costs. If Congress is not willing to create a truly represen-
tative demonstration program, Congress should not allow the creation
of these accounts because of the risk of an adverse impact on the
traditional insurance market. Congress should either completely
abandon the idea of MSAs until more is known about their actual
effects or change the demonstration program so that it will be more
representative of the actual effects that MSAs will have.
Because of the way this program is designed, it is possible that
any negative effect of allowing preferential tax treatment of MSAs will
not be realized or will be so muted that it will not appear as significant
as it really is. This could result in an ill-advised, or at least not fully
advised, increase in the availability of a tax-preferred status for MSAs.
If the demonstration program is continued, it should be opened up to
everyone-employees of large and small businesses, governmental
employees, and self-employed people. 3
A control group should also be required to help determine what
changes occur in the health-care and insurance markets that is not
affected by MSAs so that changes that are not produced by MSAs will
not be attributed to them. The simplest way to do this, in spite of
potential political difficulties, would be to place geographic limits on
the study and then compare similar areas.
Also, the duration of the study should be increased to allow the
long term effects of MSAs to be observed. However, the number of
MSAs available could continue to be limited. Changing the study
parameters is necessary so that it will show the actual effects MSAs
will have.
At a minimum, this program should be redesigned so that it will
provide valid information regarding the effects MSAs have on the
insurance market and overall health care costs. Furthermore, a more
complete study of the effects of MSAs needs to be done, regardless of
whether it is cost effective given the number of current account
203. To some extent the availability of MSAs has been expanded, as they are available, also
on a demonstration basis, to Medicare recipients. Also, bills have been introduced to remove the
caps, H.R. 1743, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997), and to allow MSAs for federal employees, H.R.
1574, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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holders. Once such a study is completed, it will be possible to
determine whether widespread availability of tax preferred MSAs will
affect the traditional health insurance market and health care costs in
a positive or negative way. If Congress is unwilling to redesign the
program so that it will yield accurate study results, the program should
be terminated.
